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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I investigate how Shaykh al‑MufÐd 
approached juristic authority or delegacy in early ShiÝi thought in 
the fourth/tenth century. I explore ShiÝi juristic authority in light of 
the doctrine of deputyship to suggest that deputyship and therefore 
the juristic authority that is based upon it were apolitical in MufÐd’s 
approach. There is no clear evidence in MufÐd’s writings that he 
regarded the jurists as possessing both the power to judge in the 
community and to administer the affairs of its members – that is to 
be a political leader. Deputyship for MufÐd is limited to judgeship.
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Introduction
The fourth/tenth century ShiÝi theologian and jurist al-Shaykh al-MufÐd 
(d. 413/1022) discusses juristic authority in his main works.1 Because of 
his influence in ShiÝi intellectual history, al-MufÐd is an ideal case for 
exploring the quest for juristic authority and the nature of leadership in 
early ShiÝi community. As a theologian, MufÐd played a significant role in 
the consolidation of ShiÝi post-occultation theology, in which the doctrine 
of occultation is a central point. As a jurist, Mufīd was also a religious 
leader of the ShiÝi community of his time. He represents a turning point 
in the transition from the traditionalist school of Qum – the main figures 
of which were al-Kulaynī (d. 329/941) and Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381/991) – to 
the rationalist school of Baghdad, of which he was the main representative. 
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I argue that in the period MufÐd lived and for some time after, 
deputyship, leadership, or juristic authority remained apolitical. 
Despite progress in establishing itself as a sect with its own intellectual 
heritage, the Twelver ShiÝi community suffered from straitened political 
circumstances. The minority status of ShiÝism and lack of access to 
political power influenced views of politics and reduced the ambit of 
deputyship to non‑political affairs. Moreover, it is understandable that, 
in the earliest period of the occultation, a majority of ShiÝi scholars 
favoured the apoliticality of deputyship due to a sense that claiming 
political authority would trespass on the Imam’s exclusive right.
Thus, for MufÐd, the deputyship of the jurists during the occultation 
is not political. He left silent the vital subject of political leadership in the 
ShiÝi community during the ghaybah. He did not consider the jurists as 
political leaders or authorities during that period. Mufid just gives jurists 
judicial authority, and he mentions two categories of jurists (al‑fuqahÁ’ 
or ÎukÁm) and amirs (al‑umarÁÞ) as the Imam’s appointees who have the 
authority to enforce ÎudÙd; in the meantime, the amirs are responsible for 
administrative, political affairs too. State‑building is part of the mission 
of a political leader; at least, Mufid should have discussed it theoretically. 
MufÐd neither produced an intellectual basis for a ShiÝi state or emirate 
led by the ShiÝi jurists, nor did he himself act politically, as a jurist.2 In 
the first part of his chief legal treatise al‑MuqniÝah, he addresses only 
topics of religious law such as purity (ÔahÁrah), daily prayers, fasting, 
religious taxes, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.3 Public matters such as the 
state or the army are not addressed. Although delegation by the Imam 
was a known concept, MufÐd does not employ the conceptual term 
niyÁbah and uses the concrete word nÁÞib (deputy) only four times in his 
extant writings. These words are also rarely used by others, and not at 
all by al‑Shaykh al‑ÑadÙq, MufÐd’s illustrious predecessor and teacher. 
MufÐd does speak of deputization in administration of the QurÞanic 
legal punishments or ÎudÙd, likely because their application would have 
stood as a symbol of the continued existence of ShiÝi law. Apparently 
in response to the community’s lack of political power, he also justifies 
the co‑operation of ShiÝi jurists and amirs with ‘unjust’ (i.e. non‑ShiÝi 
rulers). His justification for ShiÝi scholars working as functionaries 
for the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs and other Sunni political powers was taken 
up by other scholars after him, who essentially repeated his view.4 It is 
reasonable to suppose that the belief in the near return of the Twelfth 
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Imam, the MahdÐ, was a factor in limiting deputyship and pushing it 
toward a quite narrow range of functions. Since the ShiÝis expected the 
Imam to return very soon, there was no need to discuss putting political 
arrangements in place during the Imam’s absence.
In MufÐd’s time, the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs dominated the political system 
and applied Sunni law, while the sons of AbÙ ShujÁÝ DaylamÐ, the ShiÝi 
Buwayhid dynasty,5 were in their service, holding the title of Commander 
of the Commanders (amÐr al‑umarÁÞ), a military title with executive 
power. The HamdÁnids in the northern part of Iraq were another 
ShiÝi dynasty working for the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs. Thus circumstances 
were relatively favourable for the Twelver ShiÝi community, and the 
ShiÝi‑Sunni relationship was also relatively stable. The BÙyid dynasty 
promoted ShiÝi religious ceremonies such as Ashura, which took place in 
public space in Baghdad, the centre of the Sunni caliphate, in 352/962,6 
and ÝEid al‑GhadÐr7 commemorating ÝAlÐ’s imamate. The BÙyids did not, 
however, play sectarian politics against the majority Sunni population. 
As for MufÐd’s relations with the BÙyids, they were mostly friendly, 
though he was at one point exiled from Baghdad by them because of 
Sunni‑ShiÝi unrest. 
MufÐd stands as a leading theologian and jurist not only in his time, 
but long after. His main book in law is al‑MuqniÝah. The MuqniÝah was 
expanded and commented upon by Shaykh al‑ÓÙsÐ (460/1068), MufÐd’s 
prominent pupil, under the title TahdhÐb al‑AÎkÁm, which became one 
of the main four ShiÝi legal sources. From a political perspective, MufÐd 
is an apolitical representative of early ShiÝi thought, though in the 
twentieth century, there was an attempt to redefine him as the pioneer of 
the guardianship of the jurist. 
Contemporary politicization of the image of MufÐd 
I contend that juristic authority – deputyship or niyÁbah – was originally 
not political, and only became so gradually and rather late – that is, 
only in the eighteenth century under the QÁjÁrs. There has been a drive, 
however, to portray deputyship as political so that it may serve as a basis 
for the modern doctrine of guardianship of the jurist or wilÁyat al‑faqÐh. 
For instance, in 1413/1992, a ‘Millennium International Congress’ on 
Shaykh MufÐd was held by the seminary school of Qum, Iran, following 
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which his extant works were (re‑) published along with several articles 
submitted to the Congress. The Congress, unfortunately, was an effort 
to politicize MufÐd, specifically to cast him as a proponent of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s theory of wilÁyat al‑faqÐh. The politicization of MufÐd 
continued after the Millennium International Congress. AbÙ al‑FaÃl 
ShÁkÙrÐ, the author of a long preface to Ayatollah MuntaÛirÐ’s DirÁsÁt 
fÐ WilÁyat al‑FaqÐh wa al‑Dawlah al‑IslÁmiyyah, asserts that MufÐd had 
been active in politics and society. ShÁkÙrÐ says that MufÐd’s writings 
address the theory as well as the necessity of establishing a ShiÝi state. 
He claims that MufÐd made it obligatory for ShiÝis to support a political 
system or government created by qualified jurists. ShÁkÙrÐ also claims 
that MufÐd forbade any collaboration with ‘erring kings’ and oppressive 
powers (unjust sultans), though his writings show quite the opposite. 
For ShÁkÙrÐ, MufÐd’s legal opinions and views on politics represent a 
propitious development in ShiÝi jurisprudence, in contrast to the views 
of his teacher Shaykh ÑadÙq.8
Contrary to ShÁkÙrÐ’s claims, however, MufÐd never uses the term 
‘guardianship of the jurist’ or discusses anything like it. Nor does he 
broach the necessity of establishing a ShiÝi state. MufÐd did not tell ShiÝis 
to support a system created by the jurists. Far from being a political 
activist, he held that it is permissible and even in some circumstances 
obligatory to work for an unjust ruler. ShÁkÙrÐ does not provide any proof 
for his claim and no reference to a source. He refers to developments in 
ShiÝi jurisprudence between the time of ÑadÙq and MufÐd, i.e. from the 
traditionist school of Qum to the more rationalist school of Baghdad as 
involving politics, but the shift in fact occurred mostly in methodology 
and certainly not in the approach to politics. ÑadÙq and MufÐd were 
both apolitical. 
ShÁkÙrÐ quotes a lengthy passage from the KitÁb al‑ÍudÙd (the 
chapter on QurÞanic punishments) of MufÐd’s MuqniÝah and then 
comments as follows: 
It is individually incumbent (wÁjib ÝaynÐ) upon one who has 
obtained power (ghalabah yÁft) and become caliph and amir, 
as well as anyone appointed by such a person, to administer 
the QurÞanic punishments (ÎudÙd), enforce the shariÝah, 
encourage good and forbid the evil […].9 
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The issue of jurists administering QurÞanic punishments will be 
discussed in detail later on, but very briefly, it must be said that the 
quotation is not accurate. MufÐd writes about the necessity of observing 
ÎudÙd by a ShiÝi jurist appointed by a non‑ShiÝi ruler, not a ShiÝi person 
such as a jurist possessing the power to appoint someone else. There are 
two very evident tendencies in ShÁkÙrÐ’s interpretation of MufÐd’s views 
about politics and the relation between ShiÝi jurists and ‘unjust’ rulers. 
First, he tries to prove that political deputyship has long and strong 
roots among prominent ShiÝi jurists. Second, he undermines the idea 
of working for an unjust ruler, obviously with the conditions of pre‑
revolutionary Iran in mind. 
AÎmad ÀdharÐ QummÐ is even more eager than ShÁkÙrÐ to politicize 
deputyship. He states with apparent certainty that MufÐd is the first 
jurist to introduce the theory of guardianship, especially in his MuqniÝah, 
and adds that he tried to strengthen the intellectual basis for it.10 He 
does not, however, tell us where this is stated in the MuqniÝah or any 
other of MufÐd’s writings. ÀdharÐ QummÐ cites prayer leadership on the 
two ÝEids, prayers for rain, and prayers in the event of a lunar or solar 
eclipse as evidence that MufÐd propounded niyÁbah.11 Apart from these 
being quite minor functions, the jurists are actually asked, in MufÐd’s 
telling, to lead the prayer as a general duty of a religious figure, but not as 
something delegated by the Imam. From MufÐd’s view on enjoining good 
and forbidding evil, the execution of legal penalties, and the necessity of 
paying alms (zakÁt) to the ShiÝi jurists, ÀdharÐ QummÐ, astonishingly, 
infers ‘absolute guardianship of the jurist’ (wilÁyat‑i muÔlaqah‑i faqÐh) 
from al‑Mufid’s works.12 His argument is that absolute power or sulÔÁn 
in the above‑mentioned cases refers to the Prophet and the Imams; and 
since during the occultation, the jurists function as the deputy of the 
Imam, their authority is absolute.13 ÀdharÐ QummÐ does not stop there, 
for, based again supposedly on MufÐd, he takes the jurists to actually 
themselves be the ‘sulÔÁn al‑Islam’. 
It is not my goal here to respond to ÀdharÐ QummÐ’s or ShÁkÙrÐ’s 
understandings of Shaykh MufÐd; rather I only wish to show how his 
works have been subject to distortion and misunderstanding. Before 
proceeding to the main topic, I will present an overview of some key 
terms and concepts necessary to continue. 
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Key terms and concepts
The Arabic terms sulÔÁn, nÁÞib, ÎÁkim, amir, wÁlÐ, nÁÛir, and ÝÁmil are key 
to understanding niyÁbah. Their meanings have developed and changed 
from MufÐd’s time to now. These shifts are significant enough that they 
have facilitated quite different interpretations. As always with dense 
juristic and theological texts, it is necessary to pay close attention to 
Arabic usage. Therefore in this article, I will analyse how these terms 
were used in MufÐd’s time. 
NÁÞib, the general sense of which is ‘representative’ or ‘deputy’, refers 
specifically to the person to whom the Imam deputizes his functions 
during his occultation. In his chief legal work MuqniÝah, MufÐd uses nÁÞib 
five times. In this early period, however, nÁÞib was meant in a general 
and not in the specialized, technical sense we see later of deputyship 
of the Imam. ÑadÙq does not use the term at all in his four‑volume 
legal compendium, Man LÁ YaÎÃuruhu al‑FaqÐh or in his al‑MuqniÝ.14 In 
al‑FuÒÙl al‑MukhtÁrah, MufÐd calls ÝAlÐ the Prophet’s nÁÞib in speaking 
about ÝAlÐ’s great faith and virtues, but not to refer to him as a nÁÞib in 
a technical sense.15 
The term sulÔÁn is used frequently in the MuqniÝah. It is usually used in 
a general, non‑technical meaning to refer to the person who governs the 
community with comprehensive power or sovereignty, or the sovereign 
himself. In some places, it refers to the ShiÝi Imams. In others, it is used 
to speak of the head of the community acting as the judge. 16 It also 
appears in compound forms such as ‘just sulÔÁn’ or ‘right sulÔÁn’,17 ‘unjust 
sulÔÁn,’18 ‘sulÔÁn al‑Ûulmah’ (ruler of darkness)’,19 ‘sulÔÁn al‑zamÁn’ (ruler of 
the time),20 ‘sulÔÁn al‑ÃalÁl ’,21 and ‘sulÔÁn al‑Islam’.22 MufÐd calls the Imam 
sulÔÁn (obviously not referring to injustice, darkness, or misguidance). 
The Imam is the sulÔÁn al‑IslÁm, appointed by God. MufÐd uses the terms 
umarÁÞ and ÎukkÁm for political, judicial, or military delegates of the 
Imams. Who exactly are these personalities? By the ÝAbbÁsid period (in 
which MufÐd lived), ‘amir’ had a wide meaning. UmarÁÞ, the plural of 
amir, encompassed commanders, governors, princes, leaders, advisors, 
and counsellors.23 Prior to the Umayyads, amir was equivalent to ÝÁmil, 
‘functionary’, including tax‑collectors.24 Levy suggests that in the 
lifetime of the Prophet, the ÝÁmil (whose responsibility it was to collect 
alms‑taxes) was separate from that of the amir; however, they were sent 
together to newly occupied territories.25 ‘Amir’ also, of course, meant a 
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military commander. Under the caliphate, the title ‘was bestowed on an 
ÝÁmil (delegate) appointed with the approval of the caliph’.26 In ÝAbbÁsid 
times, political connotations were added to the military notion, so that 
‘amir’ came to mean both a high ranking civil and military official. 
‘Amir’ thus became the habitual title of a governor, ruler, or provincial 
military official holding political and military power together.
The term ÎÁkim in MufÐd’s usage refers to an appointee of an 
Imams. Generally, it means ‘sovereign’, ‘judge’, or ‘governor’;27 thus it 
seems vaguer than amir. ÍÁkim in MufÐd‘s MuqniÝah means ‘judge’. 
MufÐd does call the ÎÁkim the appointee of the sulÔÁn al‑Islam, that is 
to say, the Imams. ‘The sulÔÁn al‑Islam appointed by God – namely the 
guiding Imams from the family of MuÎammad – and the amirs and 
ÎÁkims whom they have appointed have the responsibility to execute the 
QurÞanic punishments.’28 However, following the statement just quoted, 
MufÐd clearly specifies that the jurist’s authority is limited to judgeship. 
Thus we must conclude that the jurists’ ÎukÙmah, like that of the amir’s 
emirate which is also mentioned here, is only part of that of the Imam. 
Only the Imam combines the two and is the sulÔÁn al‑Islam. 
The term sulÔÁn is used in a general, non‑technical sense also in 
MufÐd’s KitÁb al‑IrshÁd, where it refers to the holder of the highest level 
of power in a state, or the power itself.29 In the IrshÁd, we see the phrases 
sulÔÁn al‑ÒaÝb,30 ‘unjust ruler’, and sulÔÁn al‑risÁlah,31 meaning the Prophet. 
There is one instance in the IrshÁd where sulÔÁn denotes the Imam in its 
ImamÐ sense,32 but on other occasions, MufÐd uses the expressions sulÔÁn 
al‑zamÁn (sulÔÁn of the time) in a general sense – for instance in reference 
to an ÝAbbÁsid caliph who might be identified either as al‑MuhtadÐ or 
al‑MuÝtamid.33 
Does MufÐd use the term sulÔÁn for the jurist? He defines the Imams 
as sulÔÁn al‑Islam and then states that the amirs and ÎÁkims appointed 
by the Imams have the same authority for execution of the QurÞanic 
punishments. It is the ShiÝi jurists who judge on behalf of the Imams for 
these punishments.34 So it does not mean that the jurist is a sovereign 
also holding political and military power. 
The term nÁÛir (literally, ‘supervisor’) or nÁÛir fi umÙr al‑muslimÐn35 
(‘supervisor of the Muslims’ affairs’) refers to the sovereign person or 
judge; nÁÛir in its general, non‑technical meaning can be both judicial and 
political. However, in the section on QurÞanic punishments of MufÐd’s 
MuqniÝah, it takes on the specific meaning of judgment in relation to 
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the jurists36 and has a political meaning only for amirs.37 Shaykh ÓÙsÐ in 
his NihÁyah also terms the Imam nÁÛir fi umÙr al‑muslimÐn. He explains 
that when the Imam is not present, the just and knowledgeable ImamÐ 
jurists play his role in the case of someone dying without an executor 
for his will by appointing the executor for him.38 This is clearly a 
judicial function, and a rather narrow one at that. Kamali asserts that 
the mujtahid is competent in both judicial affairs and supervising ‘the 
affairs of the Muslims’. In reference to MufÐd, Sayyid MurtaÃÁ, ÓÙsÐ, 
and the leading mujtahid Shaykh AnÒÁrÐ (d. 1281/1864), Kamali says that 
‘[…] a fully qualified mujtahid (one qualified to exercise independent 
reasoning) is a representative (nÁÞib) of the Imam regarding judgement 
and administration of the people affairs’.39 Kamali’s statement, I would 
assert, applies to the later moments of niyÁbah, and not to the period 
subject to discussion here. There is no clear evidence in MufÐd’s writings 
that he regarded the jurists as possessing both the power to judge in the 
community and to administer the affairs of its members. There is no 
doubt that he considered the first valid; but for the second, which is 
crucial to the issue of politics, much clearer evidence is required. 
The Imam’s amirs, hÁkims, and wÁlÐs 
ShiÝi legal literature in MufÐd’s time does not present specifically ShiÝi 
definitions of the terms ÎÁkim, wÁlÐ, or amir. They are used in a manner 
very close to that seen in Sunni literature. This is probably why Sourdel 
translates wulÁt as ‘agents’ rather than giving it a political sense.40 In 
the Sunni political hierarchy in the early centuries of Islam, authority 
was transferred from the Prophet to the caliphs, with the sultan gaining 
power afterwards. Amirs included a variety of figures with lesser powers 
than the caliphs, from princes in the caliphal family to provincial 
governors and military commanders. Bernard Lewis places ‘sultan’ 
beneath ‘amir’, dating its official appearance to the year 428/1037 under 
the Great Seljuqs.41 I would assert, however, that before the Seljuqs, 
the Ghaznavids, who were contemporary to MufÐd, called themselves 
‘sultans’ and held the titles ‘amir’ and ‘sultan’ simultaneously.
Despite the parallel vocabulary, the ShiÝi reality was very different 
from that of the Sunnis. In MufÐd’s time, the model of political hierarchy 
seen among the Sunnis did not exist. MufÐd nevertheless uses the terms 
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sultan, amir, ÎÁkim, nÁÛir, and wulÁt. Unlike in the Sunni construction, he 
defines the Imams as ‘sultans of Islam’ – that is to say, the main authority, 
equal to the caliph for the Sunnis. The Imam’s source of authority is God, 
because he is appointed by Him. MufÐd says, ‘The Imams of Guidance 
are sultans of Islam, appointed by God, and the amirs and ÎÁkims they 
appoint are responsible for enforcing punishments (ÎudÙd).’42
Let us look first at the theoretical side of MufÐd’s construction. 
Instead of the caliph, the Imam is the successor to the Prophet, and 
thus the head of the community. The amirs and ÎÁkims are the Imam’s 
appointees, possessing, theoretically, the same authority as the Imam. 
It is necessary, however, to understand that they are entirely different 
figures from a theological point of view. MufÐd considers the possibility 
that the Imam’s agents have the same characteristics as the Imam, but he 
decides in every case that this is not so. It is not necessary for appointees 
to be infallible or specifically designated (naÒÒ). They must be more 
knowledgeable than others, but their knowledge does not have to be 
equal to that of the Imam. 
MufÐd’s construction of a political system, it should be understood, 
was mostly imaginary. Although he speaks about amirs appointed by 
the Imam, none actually existed. Though the terms ‘amir’, ‘ÎÁkim’, and 
‘wÁlÐ’ have political, military, and administrative meanings, they were 
not relevant even during the time of the ShiÝi Imams, who made no such 
appointments, save for the first Imam ÝAlÐ. The purely judicial title of 
‘ÎÁkim’, however, did have a reality. 
The jurists and judgeship
In MufÐd’s theology, all power belongs to God, the Prophet, and the 
Imams, one after the other. Though the Imam has disappeared, he 
still is the holder of supreme power. The Imam does, however, delegate 
judicial power. Although MufÐd does not use the term niyÁbah in his 
MuqniÝah, the general concept of deputyship is present when he discusses 
the question of the jurists taking charge of judicial affairs involving 
QurÞanic punishments (iqÁmat al‑ÎudÙd).43 Why are judicial affairs the 
subject of delegation? Traditions according to which the jurists were 
granted authority to judge belong to a time when the Imams were not 
only distant from political leadership, but also extremely reluctant to 
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mount any political claims. In a situation in which there was a lack of 
actual power, delegation of most powers was irreal. What was left was 
legal rulings and judgeship. Emphasis on these was pivotal for the ShiÝi 
community, for it kept the unofficial ShiÝi judiciary system alive and 
helped to preserve the identity of a politically marginalized community. 
The QurÞanic punishments in particular are mentioned because, as I have 
already suggested, their operation stood as a symbol of the continued 
existence of ShiÝi law. Unlike private law, they also suggested real power, 
which the jurists and their system of law were, in reality, deprived of. 
MufÐd’s detailed discussion of the ÎudÙd should be understood in light 
of these realities. 
MufÐd’s view is that the Imam has granted the ShiÝi jurists authority to 
apply the QurÞanic punishments, if possible. The QurÞanic punishments 
include the amputation of the hand for thieves, lashing for adulterers, and 
retaliation for murderers. The responsibility is, in technical terms, farÃ 
ÝalÁ al‑kifÁyah – a duty that, even if it does not have to be carried out by 
all members of the community, must be carried out by someone; as well 
as farÃ ÝalÁ al‑ÔÁÝah, a duty that can be carried out by a few, for instance 
some or one of the jurists, but only if it does not involve danger to one’s 
life, property, or religion. Thus administration of the punishments ceases 
to be obligatory for the jurists if they fear the unjust ruler or threats from 
other groups.44 MufÐd calls on the ShiÝi jurists to apply the QurÞanic 
punishments at least among their family members and servants, and 
then expand them to their relatives and other community groups, as far 
as conditions, especially safety, allow. 
Obviously, the scope for judicial activity among ShiÝis was quite 
limited. MufÐd also, however, allows the jurists to act as judges while 
serving as functionaries appointed by an ‘unjust’ ruler. MufÐd writes:
If a ShiÝi jurist is appointed by a non‑ShiÝi ruler to administer 
the QurÞanic punishments (ÎudÙd) among a group of the ruler’s 
subjects, the jurist will be personally obliged ( farÃ mutaÝayyan) 
to accept it, because of the outwardly apparent (ÛÁhir) power 
of the ruler. Then the jurist shall execute the prescribed 
punishments, enforce the ordinances, command the good and 
forbid the evil, and fight non‑Muslims (referring to jihad) and 
iniquitous persons. In this case, it is obligatory for his ShiÝi 
brothers to support him whenever he requests help; of course, 
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as long as he (the jurist) does not exceed the limits of faith and 
does not obey the ‘sultan of darkness/misguidance’ when he 
acts against God’s orders.45
This statement conveys important information. We see that working 
for an unjust ruler if asked and even obedience to such a ruler is obligatory, 
at least as far as accepting a judgeship goes. In addition, MufÐd makes it 
obligatory for other ShiÝis to support such jurists whenever they need aid 
and as long as they follow the ‘truth’ (Îaqq, i.e. ShiÝi law). If the jurists 
do not fulfil these conditions, support is forbidden.46 MufÐd is quite 
concerned about how to justify working for an unjust ruler, in light of 
the apparent prohibition in ShiÝi thought. According to MufÐd, if a ShiÝi 
jurist working in a non‑ShiÝi judicial system judges on the basis of ShiÝi 
law, his cooperation with the unjust system is allowed or even necessary. 
He stresses that neither the ShiÝi jurists nor those who are appointed 
by the oppressive sultan are allowed to judge against the permanent 
principles of ShiÝism, save in a time of great pressure when it might be 
necessary to practice dissimilation (taqiyyah) for fear of losing faith or 
life. Even at such a time, however, deliberate shedding of ShiÝi blood is 
not in any way permissible.47 Clearly, serving ShiÝi interests is the reason 
for permissibility of working with an unjust ruler. 
Thus, to review, the doctrine of niyÁbah for MufÐd is limited to 
judgeship. He explicitly says that the Imams granted ShiÝi jurists the 
authority to judge. The scholars must carry out all responsibilities given 
to judges in ShiÝi law. MufÐd says much the same in his AmÁlÐ: ‘Whenever 
God wishes good for His servants, He has righteous individuals govern 
them, jurists judge among them, and places property in the hands of the 
generous.’48 
Although MufÐd permits the ShiÝi jurist to play a role as a political 
authority if he is appointed to such a position by an unjust ruler, he only 
talks about this in connection with authority over Sunnis.49 Possibly, 
this rather odd omission of ShiÝis might be due to taqiyyah, i.e. strategic 
dissimulation. MufÐd is silent on the jurist’s political authority over 
ShiÝis because he does not want to put himself or the community in a 
dangerous position with the ÝAbbÁsids by suggesting that the jurist could 
have independent political power. Even, however, if we admit that MufÐd 
permits the jurists to possess political leadership – for which we really 
do not have solid evidence – he never represents it as a monopolistic and 
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obligatory ‘guardianship’ (wilÁyah) of the jurists. So once again, we must 
conclude that deputyship for MufÐd is limited to judgeship, and that its 
actual functioning during his time was rather narrow. 
The jurists and leadership of the Friday prayer
Leadership of the Friday prayer has been much debated by ShiÝi scholars. 
There has been a connection in Islam overall between leadership of the 
Friday prayer and political power, as the Prophet, the rightly‑guided 
caliphs, and Umayyad and the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs led the prayer. In ShiÝism, 
leading the congregational Friday prayer has been the exclusive task and 
right of the Imam, the spiritual and political leader. What then is the 
situation in the absence of the Imam? 
MufÐd was born seven or nine years after the beginning of the greater 
occultation in 329/941, so his views throw light on how the Friday prayer 
was treated among the early ShiÝi community. Let us first, however, see 
what the historical sources can tell us. History records observance of the 
congregational Friday prayer before and after MufÐd’s time. According 
to al‑KhaÔÐb al‑BaghdÁdÐ (463/1071), the ShiÝis of Baghdad had a mosque 
for Friday prayer in BurÁthÁ; the mosque was destroyed by the ÝAbbÁsid 
caliph al‑Muqtadir when it was reported to him that the congregants 
were cursing the Prophet’s companions and disobeying the ruling caliph. 
In 324/936, Amir Bajkam MÁkÁnÐ, Commander of the Commanders in 
Baghdad, ordered the mosque rebuilt, and the caliph al‑RÁÃÐ’s name 
was inscribed upon it.50 The mosque was rebuilt by 329/940 and Friday 
prayer was held there until 450/1058.51 Ibn AthÐr (630/1233) reveals that 
the congregational Friday prayer continued in BurÁthÁ during the ShiÝi‑
Sunni clashes occurring in Baghdad in 349/960 even while it was halted 
in other mosques in areas in which ShiÝis were a majority.52 
In short, the prayer did take place, despite the dominant theoretical 
view dictating that leading the Friday prayer is the exclusive right of the 
Imam. Who, we may ask, led the prayers, and what was the position of 
ShiÝi scholars? It was very probably the ShiÝi ulema themselves who led 
the prayer, due to lack of any ShiÝi political leader, though we do not have 
firm information on this, or any indication whether MufÐd participated. 
MufÐd begins his discussion of the Friday prayer in his MuqniÝah by 
saying that it is obligatory (wÁjib) and should be held in congregation.53 
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The obligation, however, depends on the presence of the Imam. MufÐd 
does not say clearly if that means the infallible Imam such that the prayer 
becomes obligatory only during his presence, or any imam, that is to say, 
a generic prayer leader. When MufÐd talks about the physical and moral 
qualities of an imam leading the Friday prayer, saying that such a person 
must be pious, a non‑slave, of legitimate birth, an adult, and so on,54 it 
does seem evident that he is referring to a fallible (ordinary or generic) 
imam. Nor does he list among the attributes of the Imam the quality of 
being a jurist or faqÐh, as he says in the case of judgeship. This leads one 
to conclude that the Friday congregational prayer in MufÐd’s view does 
not depend on the infallible Imam leading it. Some ShiÝi scholars after 
MufÐd say that the prayer during the occultation is not licit, while others 
say that it is permissible but not obligatory. It appears that MufÐd, as 
opposed to some of his successors, considered the Friday prayer obligatory 
during the occultation, with the only condition being the presence of a 
qualified imam (of any kind) and at least four other persons to form the 
congregation. Otherwise, it would become merely permissible. Thus, it 
seems, prayer leadership is not one of a jurist’s deputized duties. 
MufÐd’s students SallÁr al‑DaylamÐ (448/1056)55 and al‑MurtaÃÁ56 say 
that the Friday prayer is obligatory only when the Imam or his (specific) 
appointee is present, and not during the occultation as MufÐd says. It 
seems that it may even be prohibited during the occultation in their 
view. In his al‑NihÁyah, ÓÙsÐ (460/1068) expresses the same opinion about 
prayer before the occultation, but he also says that all kinds of prayer – 
thus presumably including Friday prayer – are permitted and may be led 
by the jurist during the occultation.57 MufÐd, in contrast, limits the role 
of the scholars and jurists in prayer to daily prayers, the ÝEid prayers, 
prayers during the eclipses of the sun and moon, and the prayer for rain.58 
The argument of Bayhom‑Daou59 and some other modern scholars 
that MufÐd held that the ShiÝi jurists could serve as leaders of Friday 
prayer because they were granted that authority by the Imam is not 
clearly understandable. This can also be seen by referring to MufÐd’s 
students DaylamÐ and al‑MurtaÃÁ. MufÐd maintains that the Imams 
delegated their judicial authority to the jurists, and nothing more. He 
does not, unfortunately, say why he excludes Friday prayer from the list 
of different prayers given above. 
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Deputyship and jihad 
ShiÝis did not participate actively in jihad, perhaps due to their political 
marginalization. This may be why MufÐd does not pay much attention 
to jihad, even though the concept of jihad weighed heavily on the minds 
of early and mediaeval Muslims. In the MuqniÝah, jihad is mentioned 
only eleven times as a noun and three times as a verb.60 MufÐd does 
not allocate an independent section of the MuqniÝah to jihad, as became 
the practice after him. He instead puts it in a section on commanding 
good and forbidding evil and QurÞanic punishments. Even here, one can 
find the word ‘jihad’ only three times: once in the title of the book, and 
twice in the body of the text.61 In his al‑FuÒÙl al‑ÝAsharah, in answer to 
objections raised by opponents of the ShiÝis about the disappearance of 
the Imam, MufÐd does say that religious duties and principles, including 
jihad, do not cease during the Imam’s absence but are fulfilled by his 
wulÁt, ÝÁmils, and amirs.62 He does not, however, provide substantial 
information about who these figures might be and how they could carry 
out jihad from within a non‑ShiÝi system.
MufÐd does not discuss jihad because it was declared by the political 
authority, while the ShiÝi Imam was not present and had not designated 
a political deputy. Nevertheless, jihad in the sense of war against kuffÁr 
does occur once in the MuqniÝah. This concerns the jurist engaging in 
jihad when he works for an unjust sultan,63 which was a reality in the time 
of MufÐd since the ÝAbbÁsids were still fighting against non‑Muslims. On 
one occasion, the word jihad is also used to describe fighting against 
non‑ShiÝi Muslims, whom MufÐd calls ‘misguided and wrongly acting’ 
(ahl al‑ÃalÁl wa al‑khilÁf ). He calls this type of jihad ‘grand’ (aÝÛam) jihad. 
Jihad in this case means the jurist using his position under the unjust 
ruler to harm non‑ShiÝis.64 The key point, in any case, is that jihad is not 
among the responsibilities granted the ShiÝi jurist, in MufÐd’s view. 
Commanding good and forbidding evil
MufÐd affirms that commanding good and forbidding evil are 
compulsory. They take two forms. The first is commanding good and 
forbidding evil by word or tongue. This is a collective duty. Wrongdoers 
violating the shariÝah need to be admonished by some individuals, not 
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by all members of the community. Using force against those who violate 
the law, the second level, is part of the duty of the sultan. Commanding 
good and forbidding evil become individually incumbent upon whoever 
has been appointed or permitted by the sultan to perform that task.65 
Note that it is not clear what MufÐd means by the sultan66 here, whether 
the Imam or any dominant power. What is clear is that it is not the 
responsibility of the jurist. 
This is the material found in MufÐd’s AwÁÞil. In his MuqniÝah, he lists 
three levels of commanding good and forbidding evil: by heart, tongue, 
and finally the hand, i.e., force. As in the AwÁÞil, he stresses that carrying 
out this duty is obligatory for all ShiÝis – whom he calls ahl al‑imÁn 
or ‘people of true belief ’ – if they are able to do so. Those with little 
or no power are responsible for commanding good and forbidding evil 
through words and force, but without wounding or killing. If, however, 
such persons may suffer harm as a result, they should command and 
forbid only with their hearts, by showing displeasure. The third level, use 
of force involving killing or wounding, is exclusive to the sultan.67 Once 
again, it is not clear what MufÐd means by the term ‘sultan’ – whether the 
Imam or any dominant power. And again we see that the one responsible 
for commanding good and forbidding evil through force is not the jurist 
– except, of course, like others in his capacity as an ordinary Muslim, 
where there is no fear of harm. Even if one assumes that by sultan of the 
time MufÐd means the ShiÝi Imam, we cannot consequently infer that 
this becomes the jurist during the occultation. 
Deputyship and religious taxes
Religious taxes, especially the khums or one‑fifth tax, have a significant 
place in ShiÝism. During the occultation, it fell to the scholars not only 
to interpret the texts concerning religious taxes, but also, for the most 
part, to practically manage them.68 
One cannot, however, infer that it was intended that the jurists be 
heads of state simply because they received these taxes. MufÐd affirms 
that the alms‑tax (zakÁt) must be given over to the jurists, but not because 
of political leadership. He says that the alms first go to the Prophet; then 
to his successor, the Imam; and then in the absence of the Imam to his 
appointed delegates (sufarÁÞ, i.e. the Imam’s representatives during the 
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minor occultation); and finally to trustworthy ShiÝi jurists when there 
is no such delegate. Certainly MufÐd views the jurists as a distinct group 
placed over others in the ShiÝi community; but this special position 
comes not from deputyship, but knowledge, as he says that the tax should 
be given to the jurists since they ‘know better than others where to spend 
zakÁt’.69 
Based on statements from MufÐd and later scholars, Bayhom‑Daou 
concludes that early ShiÝi jurists regarded themselves as the representatives 
of tax donors, rather than of the Imam.70 I have already established that 
the jurists were not the Imam’s delegates in the management of khums; I 
must add that the notion that they were deputized by donors of zakÁt is 
also not supported by available evidence. I repeat: MufÐd makes payment 
of zakÁt to the jurists mandatory not on the basis of any delegated power, 
whether from the Imam or those paying tax, but for the simple reason 
that they know best how to spend it. They do not have a formal position 
or function, but merely, in effect, provide a service.
MufÐd defines khums as an obligatory (wÁjib) tax, levied on all types 
of properties and income accruing to ShiÝis, whether through ordinary 
economic efforts or military action.71 The way the khums was to be 
collected and distributed deserves our attention, since this speaks to the 
jurists’ authority and helps us to know if such functions were part of 
a deputyship. MufÐd mentions several approaches to administration of 
khums in the absence of the Imam. These are: discontinuing it, since the 
Imam is not present; distributing it among descendants of the Prophet 
and also poor ShiÝis in general; burying it so that it can be given to the 
Imam when he returns;72 keeping it aside to be delivered to the Imam upon 
his return; and finally, as in the present dominant legal view, dividing 
it into two shares, one of which is to go to the Imam and the other to 
the needy among the Prophet’s offspring.73 Ibn IdrÐs al‑ÍillÐ (d. 598/1202) 
cites a ruling of MufÐd that shows that he favoured the last approach. 
According to Ibn IdrÐs, MufÐd replied to a community member asking 
about whom he should deliver his khums to that it should be divided 
into two portions, half for the needy among MuÎammad ’s descendants 
(specifically, orphans, the poor, and needy travellers), and half for the 
Imam. The donor according to MufÐd is responsible for delivering the 
first portion and also for giving the Imam’s share to the Imam himself, 
if he is able to reach him. If the Imam is not to be found, the donor 
should ask a trustworthy person to deliver the tax to the Imam on his 
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behalf.74 Thus according to both MufÐd’s MuqniÝah and Ibn IdrÐs’s KitÁb 
al‑SarÁÞir, ShiÝi authorities do not play a role in managing the khums. 
Payment and delivery of the tax is the duty of the donor. 
In MufÐd’s account, nevertheless, a ShiÝi working for a non‑ShiÝi 
governmental system may collect khums. He considers this function one 
of the conditions of working for a non‑ShiÝi ruler, as he says:
One who is appointed by iniquitous ( fÁsiq) persons (i.e., rulers) 
for administering societies and territories must help and 
protect the ShiÝis and pay khums on all properties and booty 
he gains through his governorship. Otherwise, his working for 
that non‑ShiÝi ruler is not permissible.75 
This case is discussed in detail below. Let us think here about who 
the ‘one appointed’ might be. There are two possibilities: the appointee 
is either a jurist, or an amir, a commander. Appointing a jurist for non‑
judicial positions was not current practice in the period we are talking 
about, so that is unlikely, leading us to conclude that the appointee being 
discussed is in reality an amir. In what capacity did this personality pay 
his taxes? Here again there are two possibilities. One may say that the 
donor is the person in authority himself, that is, he is to pay khums from 
his own income earned from working as the agent of the state.76 It is 
more logical, however, to imagine the donor of khums not as real person 
but rather a legal one. What is meant is that that, as in early Islam, the 
person in authority is obliged to collect khums from his subjects (whether 
ShiÝi or Sunni) and send it to the seat of the caliphate. Otherwise, the 
statement is redundant, since all ShiÝis in their personal capacity have to 
pay their khums. Thus we may conclude that gathering and distributing 
khums here is the responsibility not of someone functioning as a jurist, 
but a political authority. The personality concerned may indeed be a 
jurist, but his work for the ruler is nevertheless in the capacity of an amir. 
It is good to recall here that MufÐd also does not say that zakÁt, 
the other religious tax in addition to khums, is to be managed by the 
jurists as part of their deputyship. He states that zakÁt must be paid 
to the trustworthy jurists (al‑fuqahÁÞ al‑maÞmÙnÙn), but only says, as I 
mentioned, that this is to be done because the jurists know better how 
to spend it. 
MufÐd also briefly discusses the land tax (kharÁj). The whole discussion 
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is related to the period of the Imams’ presence during which they are the 
religio‑political leaders of the community. KharÁj according to MufÐd is 
of several kinds. While the cultivated lands of those who accepted Islam 
voluntarily belong to the original owners, uncultivated lands are public 
property, to be given by the Imam to persons willing to cultivate them 
and return one tenth or one‑twentieth of the income to the Imam. Land 
conquered by force belongs to the Muslims in general, and those who 
contract with the Imam to develop it give the Imam half, two thirds, or 
one third of the produce. Non‑Muslims who submit to the Imam keep 
their land and pay the poll‑tax ( jizyah), to be specified by the Imam. 
According to MufÐd, lands gifted to the Imam or lands from which the 
inhabitants have fled belong absolutely to the person of the Imam.77 
MufÐd draws on ÝAlÐ’s example to show how kharÁj should be managed. 
Despite this detailed account of what should theoretically happen during 
the time the Imams are present, MufÐd is completely silent about kharÁj 
during the occultation and possible role of the ulema. Clearly in this as 
in the previous cases, religious taxes were not part of juristic authority 
derived from deputyship. 
Deputyship from an unjust ruler is deputyship from the Imam
The relationship of jurists with a non‑ShiÝi political system deemed 
‘unjust’ has long been debated in ShiÝism. The root idea behind the 
problem is that sovereignty always belongs to God, the Prophet, and 
the Imams. Thus ShiÝis tried, both in theory and practice, to distance 
themselves from non‑ShiÝi rulers and political systems. Reality, however, 
necessitated relations of some kind, giving rise to the intellectual problem 
of legitimating cooperation with an illegitimate state. 
ShiÝi treatment of the problem differed widely, ranging from 
prohibition on any type of collaboration with an unjust state (including 
a ShiÝi one), to permission for some degree of contact, to making it 
obligatory. MufÐd has his own view. He not only permits working 
for and being delegated by a non‑ShiÝi government, but also in some 
circumstances deems cooperation necessary. He brings up the issue both 
in relation to law and politics (imÁrah). His judicial views are discussed 
above in connection with judgeship. His approach to politics is as follows:
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And the ImamÐ who commands the people and has been 
appointed outwardly (ÛÁhir) by an unjust ruler to work for 
him is in reality (ÎaqÐqah) the amir on behalf of the Imam, 
and not on behalf of the ruler of ‘the people of darkness or 
misguidance’, because he has been permitted by the Imam.78 
MufÐd touches briefly on forms of cooperation with ‘unjust’ political 
systems in his theological work AwÁÞil. For MufÐd, lending aid to 
the unjust system in the right instance is permissible and sometimes 
obligatory; although it is not permitted if one willingly or deliberately 
assists in oppression and aggression.79 Such cooperation, however, 
is allowed only with the permission of the ‘Imam of the time’, and 
under certain conditions such as helping the ShiÝi community, judging 
according to ShiÝi law, and so on.80 Now, since cooperation with an unjust 
ruler is legitimated by the Imam, the authority of a ShiÝi scholar or jurist 
working for a ruler is as authentic as the authority of those who are 
appointed by the Imam to work in the ShiÝi community. Both, in effect, 
are appointed by the Imam. It is, however, necessary to keep in mind that 
the jurists working in the community function only as judges or persons 
performing religious rituals. They are not given political duties and do 
not lead the community in non‑religious affairs. 
As mentioned above, textual and historical evidence tells us that 
MufÐd also envisioned non‑jurists holding office. As for textual evidence, 
MufÐd uses the phrase tadbÐr al‑Ý ibÁd wa al‑bilÁd (administration of 
people and territories),81 a clear reference to administrative and political 
positions. The holders of such positions were not ShiÝi scholars. That 
is to say, they were not ShiÝi scholars if the reference to ‘administration 
of peoples and territories’ refers to those functions over the ShiÝi 
community. If what is referred to is administration over all the Muslims 
as a functionary of a Sunni ruler, the office‑holder could be a jurist. The 
matter is complicated by the equivocality of words and terms in MufÐd’s 
time, when specialized technical vocabulary was not much developed in 
ShiÝi or, for that matter, Sunni legal literature. We do, in any case, have 
historical evidence: we know that in MufÐd’s time, two groups of ShiÝis 
worked for the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs, those being the jurists and the amirs. 
Having established that the office holders MufÐd talks about include 
jurists and non‑jurists, we must ask how in his view the Imam would give 
permission for the latter. It will be useful here to examine al‑MurtaÃÁ’s 
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approach toward the same issue. As we have seen, al‑SharÐf al‑MurtaÃÁ was 
the leading figure in the ShiÝi community in his time and an outstanding 
pupil of MufÐd who worked, like his father and elder brother before him, 
for the ÝAbbÁsid caliph as judge and naqÐb (head of the descendants of 
the Prophet). Kazemi demonstrates that two other ShiÝi jurists, AbÙ 
al‑FatÎ al‑KarÁjakÐ and Ibn al‑BarrÁj (al‑MurtaÃÁ’s students) also worked 
as judges for Sunni governments, so this was not an unusual situation.82 
al‑MurtaÃÁ, in fact, wrote a treatise on the subject, entitled MasÞalat fi 
al‑ÝAmal maÝa al‑SulÔÁn (On Working for the Government),83 two years 
after his teacher’s death. 
It is evident from comparing the views of MufÐd and al‑MurtaÃÁ 
that their basic idea is similar: working for an illegitimate rulership 
is permissible and even obligatory, with the permission of the Imam. 
Al‑MurtaÃÁ, however, argues the issue more fully. He categorizes the 
ruler (and consequently, rulership) into two kinds: legitimate and just 
(muÎiqq ÝÁdil) or illegitimate, unjust, and usurpatory (mubÔil, ÛÁlim, 
mutaghallib).84 For al‑MurtaÃÁ, working for a just ruler is permissible 
and even obligatory (wÁjib) in some cases, such as when it would be 
in the interests of the ShiÝi community, and is thus beyond question. 
Working for an illegitimate or unjust ruler, however, may be obligatory, 
permissible, an object of caution (mahdhÙr), evil (qabÐÎ), or forbidden. 
Holding office on behalf of a ruler who is a usurper is obligatory when 
the office holder either knows or strongly supposes (Ûann) that he will 
be capable of upholding the right (iqÁmat al‑Îaqq), rejecting falsehood, 
ordering good and forbidding evil. It is permissible when the jurist fears 
for his personal wealth if he rejects the position. It is an object of caution 
if one is forced to accept the office and believes he will be killed if he 
does not accept. It will, on the other hand, be evil to accept the office if 
holding it is a cause of evil or the office‑holder uses his office for his own 
worldly interests. Accepting the appointment is, exactly as MufÐd says, 
forbidden if it involves assisting an unjust ruler to disobey God.85 
As a rationalist, al‑MurtaÃÁ cites both rational and legal (sharÝÐ and 
ÝaqlÐ) proofs for his position.86 For instance, he cites ÝAlÐ’s caliphate as an 
example of being accepted by an unjust group (i.e. the various factions 
and persons who were in his favour following the murder of ÝUthmÁn), 
adding that there are other many cases in which scholars and pious 
men have accepted positions under an illegitimate ruler. The rational 
justification, which appears to be more important for al‑MurtaÃÁ’s 
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argument than the legal proof, concerns the interests ShiÝis derive from 
having one of their own in office. 
Thus we see that in the view of MufÐd as well as his students, jurists can 
work for so‑called ‘unjust’ rulers, since they have been given permission 
to do so by the Imam. The jurist holding such position does not, however, 
work for the unjust ruler in his capacity as a ShiÝi jurist, but only as a 
functionary (whether as an amir, or as a judge among Sunnis alone, since 
it is forbidden for ShiÝis to refer to an unjust power for judgement so 
that ShiÝis seeking judgement could refer to that jurist only privately). 
He does not have political power in his capacity as a ShiÝi jurist, even if 
he is encouraged to use his position to the advantage of the community. 
We must conclude that MufÐd’s theory of deputyship is apolitical despite 
the permission to work for unjust rulers, since the jurists are not political 
figures in their own right. 
Analysis and conclusion
In MufÐd’s perspective of the doctrine of deputyship or juristic 
authority, the doctrine is clearly apolitical. MufÐd leaves no doubt 
that ShiÝi jurists are delegated by the Imam to judge and to execute the 
QurÞanic punishments, but deputyship does not extend beyond that. 
This very limited construction reflects the political circumstances of the 
ShiÝi community in MufÐd’s time. The ShiÝis were living as a minority 
under the Sunni ÝAbbÁsids, even though the Buwayhids and Twelver 
ShiÝi HamdÁnids had gained power as well. In addition to political 
limitations, deputyship was subject to theoretical limitations resulting 
from a conviction that any worldly power other than that of the Imams 
was illegitimate and that the Hidden Imam would return soon in any 
case. Due to these limitations, the jurists, though they were supposedly 
delegates of the Imam, were reluctant to play a political role even in 
religious duties. 
Even though MufÐd says that the Friday congregational prayer is 
obligatory, he does not include it among the various prayers led by the 
ShiÝi jurists. He does not say why this is so, but one can infer that a 
specific ground or qualification of the jurist for holding the Friday 
prayer is absent, though present for the other prayers. If we look at the 
history of the Friday prayer, it is clear that the leader of this prayer has 
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had a relationship with political power.87 The Prophet MuÎammad 
instituted Friday prayers in Medina when he first gained political power, 
and holders or representatives of power among the first four caliphs, the 
Umayyads, and the ÝAbbÁsids also used to lead the prayer. The Imams 
were both the religious and political leaders of the ShiÝis, even if they 
could not, with the exception of ÝAlÐ, actually exercise political power. 
Thus it is possible that MufÐd does not consider that leadership of the 
Friday prayer falls to the ShiÝi jurists because, for him, they are not 
politically the delegates of the Imam.88
As for the khums, MufÐd, as explained above, believes that leading 
ShiÝis (whether jurists or not) who work for unjust rulers are to collect 
the khums tax. Let us now ask why that right or obligation falls to those 
persons and who distributes the funds. For MufÐd, the khums is divided 
into two parts: one belonging to the Imam, and the other reserved for 
needy descendants of the Prophet. Taxpayers are allowed to distribute the 
funds in person to the needy, but MufÐd does not tell us how the Imam’s 
share is to be delivered. It seems that in his view, no one has the right to 
spend the share of the political and religious leader of the community, the 
Imam. Nevertheless, MufÐd makes it clear that a ShiÝi figure functioning 
in the non‑ShiÝi system must collect and pay the khums. Such a person 
has no more privileges than his counterpart within the ShiÝi community, 
except for his connection to the dominant political power. Even in the 
case of the jurist with connections to political power, MufÐd does not give 
any information about the agent who manages the tax; he does not make 
it clear if he collects khums for himself to manage it, for another jurist, 
or even for the state. He also does not explain if the agent is to spend the 
Imam’s share, bury it, or hand it over to a trustworthy person to give it 
to the Imam whenever he appears. As in the case of the Friday prayer, it is 
probable that MufÐd refrains from addressing these details because of the 
connection between tax collection and political power. If tax collection 
were part of the jurists’ duties, MufÐd would have addressed the topic 
of jurists not possessing political power gathering the khums from their 
brethren. It is therefore actually not important if the ShiÝi figure holding 
office on behalf of the illegitimate ruler is a jurist, amir, or some other 
figure. The significant point is that the collection and administration of 
khums is not part of delegation (deputyship) at this time. Delegation is 
limited to judgeship, while khums is not a juristic function. 
Jihad presents a parallel case. MufÐd includes jihad among the tasks 
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of a ShiÝi jurist functioning within a non‑ShiÝi judicial system, but he 
does not mention it when discussing the tasks of judges not possessing 
political power and working within the ShiÝi community. 
Commanding good and forbidding evil is another parallel case. The 
ShiÝi jurists do not have the power to command good and forbid evil with 
force because they do not have any political power. Their responsibility 
in commanding good and forbidding evil is just the same as that of other 
Muslims. From the point of view of religious expertise they would have 
been the most appropriate persons to engage in that duty; but, first, they 
did not possess power, which is ‘a requirement in the fulfilment of this 
crucial obligation in the public interest’,89 and second, the obligation 
itself is not incumbent on every individual. 
MufÐd discussed the cooperation of ShiÝi scholars with unjust rulers 
in response to practical and theoretical limitations faced by ShiÝism. He 
looks for ways right might co‑exist with wrong. To treat this problem, 
he takes both a macro‑ and micro‑analytical view. On the macro level, 
seen in his theological works, he looks at the Sunni system overall and 
condemns it not only as unjust and false, but non‑salvific.90 In the 
AwÁÞil, for instance, he divides the Abodes (dÁr) into three: dÁr al‑Îarb 
(Abode of War), dÁr al‑IslÁm (Abode of Islam), and dÁr al‑ÐmÁn (Abode of 
True Belief).91 As Lambton writes, dÁr al‑ÐmÁn ‘comprised those places in 
which the true faith, i.e. IthnÁ ÝAsharÐ ShiÝism, prevailed, whereas the dÁr 
al‑islÁm consisted of those places where Islam other than IthnÁ ‘AsharÐ 
ShiÝism was followed.’92 In his juridical work, on the other hand, MufÐd 
works at the micro level where right can potentially co‑exist with wrong. 
From a micro perspective, the non‑ShiÝi political system, while not pure 
overall, represents a combination of aggression and justice, giving ShiÝi 
scholars the opportunity to choose just aspects and leave the wrong aside 
in assisting their community. 
How is justice to be distinguished from injustice? As I have explained, 
it is necessary to distinguish between two types of agents undertaking 
responsibilities in the so‑called unjust system, the jurists ( fuqahÁÞ) 
and amirs (umarÁÞ). MufÐd, it seems, left it to the jurists themselves to 
distinguish justice from injustice. The criteria for doing so are related to 
ShiÝism, since ShiÝism itself is considered to be ‘right’ (Îaqq). The most 
important criteria are the ability to judge in accordance with ShiÝi law, to 
look out for the interests of the community, and to prevent the shedding 
of ShiÝi blood.93 A jurist acting in the capacity of an amir applies the 
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same criteria. MufÐd is silent, however, about the case of an amir who is 
not also a jurist. 
Why did MufÐd take the trouble to formulate such elaborate 
justifications for working for an unjust ruler? The answer is found 
in the nature of delegation as perceived in that period. Delegation in 
MufÐd’s view is limited to the law, without venturing into politics or 
military affairs. This very limited notion left the ShiÝis struggling with 
their political defeat. Living without any political power whatsoever 
was difficult and harmful. The only way out of this dilemma was to 
find a way to politically reconcile with the dominant system, which 
was done by MufÐd under the rubric of ‘working for the sultan’. This 
solution as detailed by MufÐd secured the ShiÝis’ interests from one side, 
and avoided contradicting ShiÝi theology and the ShiÝi worldview on 
the other. MufÐd’s theory of ‘working for the sultan’ does not represent 
accommodation, as some have asserted, but the opposite: the least 
compromise with politics possible, carefully fenced in by theory. 
As we have seen, a ShiÝi holder of office on behalf of an illegitimate 
ruler could be either a jurist or amir. Though there were no ShiÝi amirs after 
the ÝAbbÁsid dynasty was extinguished, the ShiÝi Buyids and HamdÁnids 
were contemporary with MufÐd. One would think that MufÐd would 
be interested in the sovereignty of such amirs since for him, the jurist 
holding office on behalf of an unjust ruler is a step toward enforcing the 
ordinances of ShiÝi law. He asks the community to follow and support 
the office holder in order to enhance his legitimacy. Al‑MurtaÃÁ is very 
clearly interested in power. He says that without power, the obligatory 
enforcement of shariÝah – for instance, enjoining good and forbidding 
evil – is not possible. Power, according to al‑MurtaÃÁ, is consequently 
obligatory (wÁjib) because it is the means or is the premise of enforcement 
of shariÝah.94 
Nonetheless, neither MufÐd nor al‑MurtaÃÁ talks of building a ShiÝi 
sovereign power led by ShiÝis, whether jurists or amirs. They did not 
regard the Buyids or HamdÁnids as constituting such a power, since their 
legitimacy was derived from the ÝAbbÁsid caliphs. The term ‘just sultan’, 
with whom cooperation is permissible or obligatory according to MufÐd 
and al‑MurtaÃÁ,95 means the Imam and no one else; it refers neither 
to the jurists nor the ShiÝi amirs, because although amirs working for 
the ÝAbbÁsids theoretically had the Imam’s permission, they were not 
heads of state, so technically they were not called ‘sultans’ in MufÐd’s 
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definition of the term. And the jurists were not ‘just sultans’ because the 
authority granted to them was limited to judgeship, so they could not be 
heads of state. 
Thus it appears that the idea of working for an unjust ruler formulated 
by MufÐd and further developed by his student al‑MurtaÃÁ is a response 
to severe limitations on delegation or deputyship in its early phase. The 
goal was to prevent the ordinances of the shariÝah (in the ShiÝi version, 
of course) from being suspended. Because of the importance of this goal, 
the case of the unjust ruler continued to be discussed after MufÐd and 
was followed in practice by many others. The idea of working for an 
unjust ruler has had a profound and lasting influence on ShiÝi thought, 
for it raised this question in the minds of the jurists: if working with 
a Sunni sultan can be in the interests of ShiÝism and permitted by the 
Imam, might perhaps cooperating with a ShiÝi sultan or even establishing 
a jurist‑run state be the best choice? 
In conclusion, Twelver ShiÝis between the fourth and fifth/eleventh 
and twelfth centuries constituted a mostly apolitical community living 
under ÝAbbÁsid rule. Some ShiÝi amirs gained political and military 
power, but they were formally in the service of the ÝAbbÁsids. The 
Twelver ShiÝi religious authorities remained out of the political structure, 
occupying themselves instead with teaching and writing. It should be 
remembered, however, that the Imamate itself was not apolitical. This 
is why MufÐd uses the term sulÔÁn al‑IslÁm to describe the Imam. He 
is indeed the sultan, the sovereign power, with his sovereignty coming 
from none other than God. 
The ShiÝi jurists are not the sultan of Islam, though appointed by 
the Imam, for their authority is not equal to that of the Imam. The 
Imam excludes the jurists from being on the same level of authority 
with him, as they are granted only the authority to judge on his behalf 
as the sovereign. In other words, delegation in MufÐd’s formulation is 
apolitical. Despite the (theoretical) political authority of the Imam, it is 
clearly and explicitly limited to judgeship. That very limited delegation, 
furthermore, is conditional, as it depends on the jurist’s safety from 
potential harm from non‑ShiÝi groups and powers. 
This explains why the jurists do not, in the view of al‑Shaykh MufÐd, 
play many roles during the absence of the Imam. Their chief duties 
are purely religious, such as interpretation of the texts and teaching 
or preaching; and they are, like other members of the community, not 
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permitted to enjoin good and forbid evil through force. The management 
of khums is not in the hands of the jurists in MufÐd’s view, a very great 
difference from the later moment of niyÁbah when it is understood 
by some to be a state tax needing to be administrated by an Islamic 
government. MufÐd’s full opinion on the Friday congregational prayer, 
which is also conventionally linked to politics, remains unclear. What is 
evident at least is that delegacy in his view does not include leadership of 
the Friday prayer, although he does not say why he excludes that prayer 
from the list of those that can be led by the jurists. 
In the early moment of niyÁbah, the religious leaders of the ShiÝi 
community, i.e. the jurists, possess charisma, but not political charisma. 
The sources of their charisma are knowledge, their appointment by the 
Imams through certain traditions and doctrines, and their personal 
characteristics. The first two are found in every well‑educated jurist, 
while the third differs from one to the other. It is not clear if the ShiÝis 
expected their religious leaders to be politically active, but the leaders 
themselves were certainly reluctant to play that role. Leading figures did 
have the ability to mobilize people, gather a following, or construct a 
political charisma, but they chose not to. This is in stark contrast to the 
third moment. 
MufÐd’s interpretation of niyÁbah has had two contradictory results 
in ShiÝi thought. On the one hand, he provided a privatized, apolitical 
interpretation of ShiÝism and consequently deputyship, an interpretation 
that lasted a very long time. His influence has been tremendous. He 
focused on private affairs such as prayers, fasting, alms, and commercial 
law, while refraining from addressing public matters such as the state 
or the army. As a consequence, the ShiÝi ulema neither theorized nor 
claimed political authority through deputyship in the early centuries of 
the greater occultation. On the other hand, MufÐd’s thought also opened 
the way for a political interpretation of deputyship many centuries later. 
He justified working for a non‑ShiÝi political system using an atomistic 
approach, making it equivalent, when the terms were fulfilled, to 
working for the Imam himself. When the jurists found themselves in a 
better, less politically constricted situation, his formulation opened the 
way to them considering collaboration with a non‑ShiÝi system or even 
establishing a state themselves. After MufÐd, many prominent figures 
such as al‑MurtaÃÁ, NaÒÐr al‑DÐn al‑ÓÙsÐ, ÝAllÁmah ÍillÐ, and KarakÐ 
and others under the Safavids associated with the state recognized and 
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cooperated with state authority. Those who refused the idea that one 
can work with an ‘unjust’ ruler belonged mostly to the quietist stream 
of the tradition, save some in modern Iran such as Ayatollah Khomeini 
who rejected working for those in power in order to establish a state 
themselves. Even Ayatollah Khomeini’s arguments for establishing an 
Islamic state are quite similar to those of MufÐd justifying working for an 
oppressive ruler. In Ayatollah Khomeini’s view, an Islamic state is needed 
for religious laws to be enforced and Muslim interests to be secured, 
while for MufÐd, the same considerations permit the jurists to collaborate 
with those he considers to be ‘oppressors’. What made figures subsequent 
to MufÐd, including Ayatollah Khomeini, different from him was the 
different contexts in which they lived.
In brief, in his works, MufÐd has clarified issues regarding the 
authority of ShiÝi jurists and amirs. First, during the presence of the 
Imam, his appointees are his legitimate delegates, that is the jurists and 
amirs. Second, when there is a dominant non‑ShiÝi state, the jurists 
judge among the ShiÝis and can work for an unjust ruler. Third, the ShiÝi 
amirs can work for a non‑ShiÝi political system while the legitimacy 
of their work steams from the Imam’s permission, like the case of the 
jurists. Forth, MufÐd remains silent on the question of establishing an 
independent rulership by ShiÝi jurists, and whether or not it would 
be considered legitimate. While the jurists and the amirs are equally 
legitimate appointees of the Imam for enforcing QurÞÁnic punishments 
(ÎudÙd), questions remain. During the occultation, did ShiÝi scholars 
only focus on delegacy and the legitimate authority of the jurists in 
the judicial field, or politics as well? Why did they exclude the amirs, 
given that they had been introduced as the Imam’s representative 
regarding administration of the people affairs? These are areas of much‑
needed research.
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